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Today I speak with Arathi Sriprakash, a lecturer in the sociology of education at the University of Cambridge.

Arathi co-edited with Keita Takayama and Raewyn Connel a special issue of Comparative Education Review on post-colonialism in the field of comparative and international education.

The special issue shows that the field of comparative and international education continues to have many colonial entanglements, which have gone unrecognized in most accounts. Colonial logics underpinned many of the field’s founding figures and contemporary forms of modernization theory continue to be widely assumed today:. Knowledge is produced in the global north, often with data taken from the global south; theory is reserved for northern scholars; and some societies, like CIES in North America, have held more power over smaller societies from Asia and Africa. In most aspects of the field, we continue to see uneven power dynamics of where and how knowledge is produced by whom and with what effect.

The special issue argues that post-colonial theory, broadly defined, can help overcome the continued prevalence of colonialism in the field today.  The co-editors call for a rethinking of the way knowledge is produced in CIE.

Arathi joined FreshEd to detail some of the ideas in the special issue.

Citation: Sriprakash, Arathi, interview with Will Brehm, FreshEd, 57, podcast audio, January 23, 2017. https://www.freshedpodcast.com/arathisriprakash/

Will Brehm 1:55
Arathi Sriprakash, welcome to FreshEd.

Arathi Sriprakash 1:57
Thanks, Will.

Will Brehm 1:59
So, what is the typical narrative of the history of comparative education? How do people in the field normally understand the history of the field itself?

Arathi Sriprakash 2:11
Well, as we as we outline and now opening piece at the of the Special Issue, the foundational story of the field of Comparative Ed is one that is very much seen as Western in terms of the main protagonists and their ideas and approaches. So, for example, we see the typical story of the foundation of the field, well certainly the one found in major textbooks. It begins with a work of French thinker, Marc-Antoine Jullien, whose plan and preliminary views for a work on comparative education, which was published in 1817 emphasized the need for a kind of scientific study of education during the Enlightenment paradigm of modernity. And then from there other prominent figures that make an entry later in the story of the foundation of the field in the 20th century include Michael Sadler, Isaac Kandel, Nicholas Hans, George Bereday amongst a host of familiar names. And so, all of these figures significantly were trained and working in the global north. And so, what we’re exploring in this special issue is how what’s often missing in this narrative about the field of the ways that non-English language and non-Western scholarship in education has shaped the field from its inception. And also, when accounts of non-Western projects of comparative ed are included in the field’s history, these are somehow seen as a separate development – an occurrence that can be added on to the main story if you like. And the effect of this is that the story remains one that locates comparative education as a particularly Western scientific development. So, the concern that Keita and Raewyn and I had when we were thinking about the Special Issue is that this kind of narrative of the field’s development obscures the very specific historical and geopolitical context in which comparative methodological advances were made. What we were trying to do is set up to explore how the narratives of the field erases its deep entanglements with colonial hierarchies, interests and modes of control, if you like.

Will Brehm 4:29
So, let’s dig into that a little bit more.  From my understanding, the field… there’s always an emphasis on context. How does our field, or how does the field of Comparative Education understand context? And perhaps, is that problematic? Is that part of this global north perspective?

Arathi Sriprakash 4:59
Good question. I think it’s really important to acknowledge that a respect for others has been a central concern of the field since it began. After all, comparativists consider it one of their responsibilities to provide fully contextual knowledge of other countries’ educational practices. So, you know, one can’t understand education separate from its social and cultural environment. And quite simply, the idea that ‘context matters’ is at the heart of Comparative Education. So, in this sense, Competitive Ed has a history of embracing what might be understood as a “relativist” epistemology. That’s the idea that knowledge is always relative to the particular conditions of knowing. And I think this is especially apparent in the founding scholars’ interest in the idea of a national character, meaning that education always needed to be adjusted according to the cultural context or the character of each nation. So certainly, the idea of context is at the heart of what we do in the field.

Will Brehm 6:03
So, is this where the idea of methodological nationalism would come in, where the unit of analysis is the nation and that’s how we see the different cultures are usually nation bound?

Arathi Sriprakash 6:17
There has been a strong tradition in the field of this what’s now called methodological nationalism. But there’s also been movements away from that. I think we’ve seen in the last decade or so an increasing interest in the transnational circulation of ideas. And I think this is important to recognize that we do have people working in the field who are not seeing the nation as the unit of analysis, or the unit of comparison, per se. I mean, we’ve also importantly, had very important work done in the field that has considered time as the unit of comparison where historical approaches have sought to understand the shifts in how education systems or practices have been differently understood over different periods of time within a nation or within a geographic context.

Will Brehm 7:12
And what has been the purpose of comparison in the way we understand the history of Comparative Education?

Arathi Sriprakash 7:21
Well, I’d say the purpose of comparison, specifically, deeply contextualized comparison is to better understand one’s own society. And this has in fact, been a long-standing underpinning ethos of the field. So, for example, one of the fields prominent scholars, George Bereday, argued in 1964, it’s self-knowledge born of the awareness of others that’s the finest lesson in Comparative Education. So, we can say that the field has in one sense emerged from an ethics of deep reflexivity. George Bereday went on to say that the aim of Comparative Education is to relax national pride in order to permit events and voices from abroad to count in the reappraisal and reexamination of schools in one’s own country. So, you can see that there is this engagement of learning about others in order to reflect upon oneself if you like.

Will Brehm 8:16
And it seems like that notion of comparing with others to reflect about oneself is very much bound up with the field’s many societies around the world. And these societies are usually geographically bound. So, in Europe, or in America, or in Australia they have the Oceania and in Japan they have a society. And so, there’s all these different Comparative Education societies, and in a sense it’s these different societies trying to learn from one another and they actually all come together and something that you wrote about, the World Congress of Comparative Education Societies. Can you tell us a little bit about the World Congress?

Arathi Sriprakash 9:08
Yes, so the World Congress, the WCCES, as many know acts as an umbrella body if you like for some 40 comparative and international education societies around the world, and I think what’s important for us to note is the core of the mission of the WCCES is to recognize and respect the plurality amongst its members. So, I guess the collective effort of the Comparative Education field is its respect for different national values, practices, histories and systems. So, this kind of respect for difference and inclusive kind of approach is certainly at the heart of the field and even in how the field is organized institutionally through societies and through the umbrella organization of the WCCES. However, what I want to say Will, is that I think what we in the field have failed to do as a collective enterprise is give more attention to the critical role that uneven power relations have played and continue to play in the making of comparative knowledge. So, for example, I’m thinking about the structural inequalities between the researcher and the research within our own work between the home country of the researchers and the so-called “targeted” countries of our scholarship. So, what I’m talking about is really the geopolitics of comparative knowledge production.

And I think about the dimension of power relations, these power relations, is how and why specific types of social science theories and methodologies becomes sponsored and taken up by the field over other forms of knowledge and approaches. And I think this is particularly important, especially in the current context, where we see the rise of ideas about evidence-based policy discourse, where academics’ scholarship is increasingly tied to interventions, not only by states, but by non-state agencies. So, the kinds of problems that get recognized and are deemed to be solvable over other kinds of problems; the sort of frames that we bring to understand the world and the kinds of solutions we sponsor in our work are very, very important. They have very real material effects, given the link between research and policy and intervention. So, I guess to put this simply, Comparative Education has been really great at acknowledging diversity, but I think it’s done less well at acknowledging the ways in which historically specific power relations really profoundly shape how knowledge about difference in the field is produced.

Will Brehm 12:04
Can you give an example of the geopolitics of the knowledge production that you’re talking about?

Arathi Sriprakash 12:12
Yes, so I guess if we look back through history, modern education systems and practices have had deep connections to colonial projects of control. So, historical research has shown how education was central to colonial administration, for example, in the British and French control of Africa and South Asia. And from the late 19th century, education scholars in particular, played a role in establishing educational systems in the colonized world. So, in the post-colonial context after World War II, research has also shown how education was a primary site of soft power. So, for example, in the 1950s, the US State Department contracted over 50 universities to work in underdeveloped countries worldwide. So systematically if you like, Western comparative educationalists operated as experts, in a way, who legitimized and spread particular ways of knowing the world. So, where knowledge is seen to reside, and how it is seen to kind of be legitimately spread, this is part of the geopolitics of knowledge production and circulation. So, particular scientific ideas about education in the name of progress development and modernization, these were all part of this kind of effort around postwar nation-building that was tied to the geopolitics of the time. I’d say that after the Cold War, such ideologically charged engagement with education overseas was arguably not so explicit. However, there have been scholars who have pointed out the ways in which contemporary Education Development is enmeshed in new securitization agendas and militarization agendas, and also how the resurgence of particular types of methodologies, particularly kind of the resurgence of quantitative methods in the field produces a particular type of knowledge that’s tied to neoliberal agendas of governance. The old saying goes, “the relationship between knowledge and power”. This is very much seen in how Comparative Education has been used, historically very much bound up in a broader politics of global change.

Will Brehm 14:40
Let’s take a short break. Each year, the Comparative and International Education Society holds elections for the position of Vice President. The way the Society is organized means that this person will automatically become the President of the Society after serving one year as Vice President. Every VP, in other words, steps up to hold the Presidency. So, VP elections are a big deal. This year, two outstanding candidates have been nominated David Post and Aaron Benavot. FreshEd will interview both David and Aaron about their plans for CIES if elected. In the run up to these interviews – which will air on February 6th – you can submit questions for me to ask both candidates. You can submit questions by tweeting @ FreshEdPodcast, or by emailing will@freshedpodcast.com. Questions have to be submitted by January 25th, so please hurry. Let’s return to my conversation with Arathi Sriprakash about colonialism in comparative and international education.
So, is one of the main problems here that indigenous knowledge is not recognized as being as valuable as the knowledge coming out of the global North?

Arathi Sriprakash 16:06
Yes. So, as Raewyn Connell emphasized a decade ago in her book Southern Theory, the global south is a rich and varied theoretical resource. But a review of Comparative Education research will quickly reveal the dominance of Northern theoretical tools and views. So, the South simply is seen as a side of data collection, the North as a side of theory generation. And this is indeed a matter of geopolitics. It’s about where expertise is seen to lie, where labor and institutions have funded, and how particular theories and methodologies are made legitimate, if you like, over others. And I guess to give you a contemporary example, there are currently huge national funding schemes in the United Kingdom, where I work, to sponsor social science research on international education. And what I found that is built into many of these schemes is an explicit requirement for so-called “capacity building”. Now, capacity building can take many forms, but it does have echoes of technical assistance programs in which Western scholars are positioned as the “experts” using their knowledge to build capacity in poor countries. Now, I can see that materially poor countries might benefit from infrastructural provision, but there is a risk that such discourses of capacity building in the research world positions the global South as somehow empty of its own epistemological resources for tackling those complex social problems that societies are facing. So, as such, the uneven power relations in the circulation and production of knowledge and education is reproduced. So once again, the South is seen as a side of data extraction, or intervention through the use of Northern theoretical expertise, and in fact, Northern labor.

Will Brehm 18:01
Yes, I feel like I see this all the time. And in fact, I must say, I admit to doing some of it. You know, using French theorists to try and understand what’s going on in Cambodia. And so, I feel like I’m also very much a part of that legacy of Comparative Education.

Arathi Sriprakash 18:24
Well, I mean, I think that’s it’s really important for us so to be reflecting on this because I too was trained in the work of Northern theorists. This still figures highly on our syllabuses within the field. And I think it’s important to recognize the ways these legacies shape our engagement in the field and how we ourselves are enmeshed in this. So this is not so much about instilling guilt within individual researchers, or trying to lay blame amongst individuals, but it is about recognizing the history of the field and understanding the deep politics in what we do so that we can strive to act ethically in our engagements moving forward.

Will Brehm 19:19
So, turning to the field, again, how do textbooks on Comparative Education understand these issues of uneven knowledge production and uneven power relations and theoretical devices being created in the global North and simply being applied to developing countries or the global South? Are these issues captured in the histories, or in the textbooks on Comparative Education? And more importantly, is there a recognition of indigenous knowledge in Comparative Education?

Arathi Sriprakash 20:01
Good question. I think there is a growing recognition of indigenous knowledges in some theories, even the role of postcolonial analyses in the field. There is an emerging discussion on this. But I would say that the way that it’s frequently configured is add on to the dominant narrative of the field emerging from the West. So, it might be that you’ve got the dominant narrative, but then there have been different ways of knowing, and it’s sort of an additive approach. I think, Raewyn Connell talks about this as a mosaic epistemology; that there are many different parts that make up a picture. So, this is one way to think about plurality, but I think in general, it doesn’t address head-on the relations of power that mean that some knowledge becomes more legitimate and is allowed to become dominant over others.

Will Brehm 21:14
One of the things that you do in this introduction to the Special Issue is, in a sense, give a retelling of one of the main founders of the field named Isaac Kandel. Can you tell us this, in a sense this “retelling” of his background?

Arathi Sriprakash 21:33
Yes, okay. So this is an interesting story that Keita actually did some work on and Kandel was a professor at Columbia’s Teachers College and was a lead researcher at the university’s International Institute in the 1920s up to the 1940s, I believe, and really reflecting the field’s interest in epistemological relativism that I mentioned the before – the idea of national cultures and characters. Kandel really did acknowledge national differences; he had this acceptance of plurality in his work at one level. This is certainly the narratives of the foundational scholars such as Kandel. But I think what’s important to recognize is that he was writing from a particular geopolitical position, so the International Institute in which he worked was involved in the administration and assessment of colonial education systems introduced by the US government, works that that by and large accepted the logics of US imperialism. So, what we start to see in Kandel’s work is that national difference was explained through cultural models. So, different cultural levels were used to explain the failure of particular nations in introducing a so-called “American system”. And it’s the American system that Kandel described as – and this is a quote – “the most advanced experiment in democratic education”. So, national difference then became understood as a kind of civilizational gap. So, if you weren’t able to have the most advanced system in your country, then this is somehow a reflection of a gap in your civilizational history or capacity. So, at the core of such ideas, even if they were implicit, rather than explicit, were racialized schemes of stages of maturity or stages of civilization in which colonial subjects were placed at the bottom of an evolutionary progression. So, even though we might see Kandel and other founding figures in the field as very much respecting diversity, these appeals to diversity – that recognition of national difference – are actually not without hierarchy. So, a relativist epistemology might appear to value diversity, but when it’s situated within its geopolitical context, we can actually see how it reproduces a colonial logic of difference and, in fact, subjugation.

Will Brehm 24:19
And with Isaac Kandel, that story, it also has the complex notion of “the expert”, where it’s Isaac Kandel himself who can help those “lower-tiered” civilizations move up using the right prescribed educational kind of remedies. And so, you have that notion too, which is so telling back then, but also so relevant to today’s world of Comparative Education scholars doing a lot of work in Educational Development where we see a similar sort of hierarchy and difference.

Arathi Sriprakash 25:10
Absolutely. And I think it’s in how our program is structured, it’s how funding circulates through the field, and there’s a real epistemological legacy here in the sense that modernization theory, even though it’s been highly contested over many decades, continues to be dominant – if not named – within the field currently. Because expertise is seen to lie in the West and the idea that the non-West would be modernizing or developing in this kind of linear, staged way, with these correct inputs from the West, I mean, this sort of relationship very much exist in the present day.

Will Brehm 25:59
Do you think that modernization theory is in a sense, in many respects, the assumed position of many researchers in the field?

Arathi Sriprakash 26:08
I think, if not consciously, then it’s something that is certainly enmeshed in our categories of analysis, in our approach; certainly in Comparative Ed when we’re thinking about systems in one country and think, “Okay, how might we reform an education system in another to look like the ideal?” So I certainly think it’s not necessarily something that scholars or researchers might set out to be enacting, but I certainly think it’s embedded in our frames of knowledge, and part of that comes back to this history of Comparative Education as having the normative West central to our idea of the world.

Will Brehm 27:06
So, some of this inequality, or this privileging of the North over other ways of knowing and thinking comes from this – like you’re saying – the structures that exist of Comparative Education. And so those structures can be, as we said earlier, the World Congress, and even there you show that there is an inequality in which societies have, in a sense, “power” within that umbrella organization.

Arathi Sriprakash 27:39
Yes, very much so. It’s also if we reflect on journal publications, some of the leading journals in our field published in English, they are run mostly in the UK and in North America, the editorial boards are largely made up of scholars from those countries. I think that these all create factors which allow western frames of knowing to dominate in the field.

Will Brehm 28:15
So, your new Special Issue tries to bring in ideas of postcolonialism into the field of Comparative Education. What is post colonialism in a nutshell?

Arathi Sriprakash 28:29
So, postcolonialism in a nutshell – I’d say that it’s about recognizing the historically specific relations of colonialism that led to, or deepened, inequalities between countries and peoples and groups, and having a deeper understanding of this history also allows us to see the active legacies of colonialism in the present day. So we might say that we are in the postcolonial era as in “after colonialism”, but there are continuing legacies of the colonial era that shape our present knowledge systems; the hierarchies around institutions, cultural practices; and even the ways in which we perhaps don’t use language of “uncivilized” and “civilized” anymore, but those hierarchies of culture and practice that  continue to be assumed, if not explicitly, implicitly, within the field.

Will Brehm 29:37
So you mentioned that we can recognize and reflect on the history of our field in our own work, but how else can we, in a sense, try and break free from this colonial past that is so clear, and that you articulated so clearly?

Arathi Sriprakash 29:59
Well, I think one part of it is to start considering what the role of Southern theory and indigenous knowledge might be for the field. And I suppose in saying that, what I do want to emphasize is that these terms, “Southern theory”, “indigenous knowledge”, they attempt to capture the many and rich sources of knowledge about the social world that have been located in the global South or/and amongst indigenous people. So, there is no one Southern theory or one indigenous knowledge. They’re not sources that are static, and unchanged by time, but just like any other knowledge system they’re historically situated and mutable. So, I guess by thinking about these areas of knowledge as legitimate and important resources for the field, we start to decenter the Global north in the process of knowledge production. And I think this has been done fairly well by the decolonial school that has emerged most prominently in Latin America, which has used the “culture of the colonized” to critique the coloniality of knowledge, if you like.

Will Brehm 31:15
So, you think that these sorts of approaches could help Comparative Education as a field? Kind of embrace postcolonialism and maybe make knowledge more diverse and open and have new ideas?

Arathi Sriprakash 31:37
Yes, okay, so I think there’s a few things that it could do. Firstly, the use of such non dominant theoretical framework – Southern theories, indigenous knowledges, etc. – can work to undermine the uneven power relations that naturalizes the intellectual division of labor in the field, the idea that we talked about where Western scholars have seen as “experts”, somehow that the expertise lies in the West and can be applied to the global South. So, in that sense, it sort of interrupts the taken-for-grantedness of Western expertise in the work in Comparative Education. Secondly, I think that such knowledge helps to provincialize what’s otherwise seen as a universalist epistemology; the idea that Western theory is universally applicable. Well, I think this is an idea that gets shaken up, and I think it recognizes that there are different ways in which the complex social problems of the world can be addressed. And I think lastly, the recognition of Southern theory and indigenous knowledges revalues knowledge that has been subjugated by colonial power relations over different periods and times. So, whether we’re talking about colonialism, relations of neocolonialism and what we’re seeing in the contemporary context neoliberal governance which is narrowing particular forms of knowledge. I think this is about that difficult task of countering what Gayatri Spivak terms “epistemic violence”, in which the knowledge and understanding of the Southern majority are dismissed, and the South is continued to be positioned as the colonial “other”. So, it’s really about disrupting that hierarchy of the South as “other”, if you like. So, what we’re calling for here is an ongoing conversation about how the field can recognize its colonial entanglements and work towards this sort of postcolonial engagement.

Will Brehm 33:56
Well, it sounds like a very exciting future direction for our field, so Arathi Sriprakash thank you so much for joining FreshEd.

Arathi Sriprakash 34:06
Thanks very much, Will.

Will Brehm 1:55
Arathi Sriprakash, bienvenue à FreshEd.

Arathi Sriprakash 1:57
Merci, Will.

Will Brehm 1:59
Donc, quel est le récit typique de l’histoire de l’éducation comparée ? Comment les personnes travaillant dans ce domaine comprennent-elles normalement l’histoire du domaine lui-même?

Arathi Sriprakash 2:11
Eh bien, comme nous l’avons souligné et comme nous entamons désormais le numéro spécial, l’histoire fondamentale du domaine de l’éducation comparée est très largement assimilée à l’Occident en ce qui concerne les principaux protagonistes, leurs idées et leurs approches. Ainsi, par exemple, nous voyons l’histoire typique de la fondation du domaine, et certainement celle que l’on trouve dans les principaux manuels scolaires. Elle débute avec un ouvrage du penseur français Marc-Antoine Jullien, dont le plan et les vues préliminaires pour un ouvrage sur l’éducation comparée, qui a été publié en 1817, ont souligné le besoin d’une sorte d’étude scientifique de l’éducation pendant le paradigme des Lumières de la modernité. Et puis de là, d’autres personnalités éminentes qui entrent plus tard dans l’histoire de la fondation du domaine au XXe siècle, dont Michael Sadler, Isaac Kandel, Nicholas Hans, George Bereday parmi une foule de noms familiers. Ainsi, toutes ces personnalités ont été entraînées et ont travaillé dans le Nord. Ce que nous explorons dans ce numéro spécial est donc la façon dont ce qui manque souvent dans ce récit sur le domaine, c’est la façon dont les langues non anglaises et les bourses non occidentales dans le domaine de l’éducation ont façonné le domaine depuis sa création. De plus, quand des projets non occidentaux d’éducation comparée sont inclus dans l’histoire du domaine, ils sont en quelque sorte considérés comme un développement séparé – un événement qui peut être ajouté à l’histoire principale si vous le souhaitez. Et l’effet de ceci est que l’histoire reste celle qui situe l’éducation comparée comme un développement scientifique particulièrement occidental. Ainsi, le souci que Keita, Raewyn et moi-même avions quand nous avons pensé au numéro spécial est que ce genre de récit du développement du domaine obscurcit le contexte historique et géopolitique très spécifique dans lequel les avancées méthodologiques comparatives ont été faites. Ce que nous essayions de faire, c’est d’explorer comment les récits du terrain effacent ses enchevêtrements profonds avec les hiérarchies coloniales, les intérêts et les modes de contrôle, si vous voulez.

Will Brehm 4:29
Donc, creusons un peu plus ce sujet.  D’après ce que je comprends, le domaine… il y a toujours une emphase sur le contexte. Comment notre domaine, ou comment le domaine de l’éducation comparative, comprend-il le contexte ? Et peut-être est-ce problématique ? Est-ce que cela fait partie de cette perspective globale du Nord?

Arathi Sriprakash 4:59
Bonne question. Je crois qu’il est vraiment essentiel de reconnaître que le respect des autres a été une préoccupation centrale du domaine depuis ses débuts. Après tout, les comparativistes considèrent qu’il est de leur responsabilité de fournir une connaissance pleinement contextuelle des pratiques éducatives des autres pays. Vous savez donc qu’on ne peut pas comprendre l’éducation sans tenir compte de son environnement social et culturel. Et tout simplement, l’idée que “le contexte importe” est au cœur de l’éducation comparée. En ce sens, l’éducation compétitive a toujours embrassé ce qui pourrait être compris comme une épistémologie “relativiste”. C’est l’idée que la connaissance est toujours relative aux conditions particulières de la connaissance. Et je crois que cela est particulièrement évident dans l’intérêt des universitaires fondateurs pour l’idée d’un caractère national, ce qui signifie que l’éducation doit toujours être ajustée en fonction du contexte culturel ou du caractère de chaque nation. Il est donc certain que l’idée de contexte est au cœur de ce que nous faisons sur le terrain.

Will Brehm 6:03
Donc, c’est là qu’intervient l’idée de nationalisme méthodologique, où l’unité d’analyse est la nation et c’est ainsi que nous voyons que les différentes cultures sont généralement associées à une nation?

Arathi Sriprakash 6:17
Il y a eu une forte tradition dans le domaine de ce que l’on appelle aujourd’hui le nationalisme méthodologique. Mais il y a aussi eu des mouvements qui s’en sont écartés. Je crois que nous avons remarqué, depuis une dizaine d’années, un intérêt croissant pour la circulation transnationale des idées. Et je pense qu’il est essentiel de reconnaître que nous avons des gens qui œuvrent dans ce domaine et qui ne considèrent pas la nation comme l’unité d’analyse, ou l’unité de comparaison, en soi. Je veux dire, nous avons aussi, et c’est essentiel, fait faire des travaux très importants dans le domaine qui ont considéré le temps comme l’unité de comparaison, où les approches historiques ont cherché à comprendre les changements dans la manière dont les systèmes ou les pratiques d’éducation ont été compris différemment sur différentes périodes de temps au sein d’une nation ou dans un contexte géographique.

Will Brehm 7:12
Et quel a été le but de la comparaison dans la façon dont nous comprenons l’histoire de l’éducation comparée?

Arathi Sriprakash 7:21
Eh bien, je dirais que le but de la comparaison, plus précisément de la comparaison profondément contextualisée, est de mieux comprendre sa propre société. Et c’est en fait un principe de base de longue date dans ce domaine. Ainsi, par exemple, l’un des plus éminents spécialistes du domaine, George Bereday, a affirmé en 1964 que la meilleure leçon de l’éducation comparative est la connaissance de soi, née de la conscience des autres. On peut donc dire que ce domaine est en quelque sorte issu d’une éthique de la réflexivité profonde. George Bereday a poursuivi en déclarant que le but de l’éducation comparée est d’assouplir la fierté nationale afin de permettre aux événements et aux voix de l’étranger de compter dans la réévaluation et le réexamen des écoles de son propre pays. Vous pouvez donc voir qu’il y a cet engagement à apprendre sur les autres afin de réfléchir sur soi-même si vous le souhaitez.

Will Brehm 8:16
Et il paraît que cette notion de comparaison avec les autres pour penser à soi-même est très liée aux nombreuses sociétés du domaine dans le monde. Et ces sociétés sont généralement liées géographiquement. Ainsi, en Europe, ou en Amérique, ou en Australie, il y a l’Océanie et au Japon, il y a une société. Et donc, il y a toutes ces différentes sociétés d’éducation comparée, et dans un sens, ce sont ces différentes sociétés qui essaient d’apprendre les unes des autres et elles se réunissent en fait toutes ensemble et quelque chose que vous avez écrit, le Congrès mondial des sociétés d’éducation comparée. Pouvez-vous nous en dire un peu plus sur le Congrès mondial ?

Arathi Sriprakash 9:08
Oui, donc le Congrès mondial, le CMAEC, comme beaucoup le savent, agit comme un organisme de tutelle si vous voulez pour quelque 40 sociétés d’éducation comparée et internationale dans le monde, et je pense que ce qui est important pour nous de noter est que le cœur de la mission du CMAEC est de reconnaître et de respecter la pluralité parmi ses membres. Donc, je pense que l’effort collectif du domaine de l’éducation comparée est son respect des différentes valeurs, pratiques, histoires et systèmes nationaux. Ce respect de la différence et cette approche inclusive sont certainement au cœur du domaine, et même dans la façon dont le domaine est structuré institutionnellement à travers les sociétés et l’organisation faîtière du CMAEC. Toutefois, ce que je veux dire, Will, c’est que je pense que ce que nous avons échoué à faire sur le terrain en tant qu’entreprise collective, c’est d’accorder plus d’attention au rôle critique que les relations de pouvoir inégales ont joué et continuent de jouer dans l’élaboration de la connaissance comparative. Ainsi, par exemple, je pense aux inégalités structurelles entre le chercheur et la recherche au sein de notre propre travail entre le pays d’origine des chercheurs et les pays dits “ciblés” de notre bourse. Ce dont je parle, c’est en fait de la géopolitique de la production de connaissances comparatives.

Et je pense à la dimension des relations de pouvoir, ces relations de pouvoir, c’est comment et pourquoi des types spécifiques de théories et de méthodologies des sciences sociales sont parrainés et repris par le terrain par rapport à d’autres formes de connaissances et d’approches. Et je pense que c’est particulièrement important, surtout dans le contexte actuel, où nous assistons à la montée des idées sur le discours politique basé sur les faits, où les travaux des universitaires sont de plus en plus liés aux interventions, non seulement des États, mais aussi des agences non étatiques. Ainsi, les types de problèmes qui sont reconnus et jugés comme pouvant être résolus par rapport à d’autres types de problèmes ; le type de cadres que nous apportons pour comprendre le monde et les types de solutions que nous parrainons dans notre travail sont très, très significatifs. Ils ont des effets matériels très réels, étant donné le lien entre la recherche et la politique et l’intervention. Donc, pour dire les choses simplement, l’éducation comparée a été très efficace pour reconnaître la diversité, mais je crois qu’elle l’est moins pour reconnaître la manière dont les relations de pouvoir historiquement spécifiques façonnent profondément la production de connaissances sur la différence dans le domaine.

Will Brehm 12:04
Pouvez-vous fournir un exemple de la géopolitique de la production de connaissances dont vous parlez?

Arathi Sriprakash 12:12
Oui, donc je crois que si nous regardons en arrière dans l’histoire, les systèmes et pratiques d’éducation contemporains ont eu des liens étroits avec les projets coloniaux de contrôle. Ainsi, la recherche historique a montré comment l’éducation était au centre de l’administration coloniale, par exemple, dans le contrôle britannique et français de l’Afrique et de l’Asie du Sud. Et à partir de la fin du XIXe siècle, les spécialistes de l’éducation, en particulier, ont joué un rôle dans la mise en place des systèmes éducatifs dans le monde colonisé. Ainsi, dans le contexte post-colonial après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la recherche a également montré comment l’éducation était un site principal de pouvoir doux. Ainsi, par exemple, dans les années 1950, le Département d’État américain a passé des contrats avec plus de 50 universités pour qu’elles œuvrent dans les pays sous-développés du monde entier. Ainsi, systématiquement si vous voulez, les éducateurs comparatifs occidentaux ont œuvré comme des experts, d’une certaine manière, qui ont légitimé et diffusé des manières particulières de connaître le monde. Ainsi, l’endroit où le savoir est considéré comme résidant, et la manière dont il est considéré comme étant légitimement diffusé, fait partie de la géopolitique de la production et de la circulation du savoir. Ainsi, les idées scientifiques particulières sur l’éducation au nom du développement du progrès et de la modernisation, tout cela faisait partie de ce genre d’effort autour de la construction de la nation d’après-guerre qui était liée à la géopolitique de l’époque. Je dirais qu’après la guerre froide, un tel engagement idéologique en faveur de l’éducation à l’étranger n’était sans doute pas aussi explicite. Cependant, certains universitaires ont indiqué la manière dont le développement de l’éducation contemporaine s’inscrit dans les nouveaux programmes de sécurisation et de militarisation, et aussi comment la résurgence de certains types de méthodologies, en particulier la résurgence des méthodes quantitatives sur le terrain, produit un type particulier de connaissances qui sont liées aux programmes néolibéraux de gouvernance. Le vieil adage dit : “la relation entre la connaissance et le pouvoir”. On le voit bien dans la façon dont l’éducation comparée a été employée, historiquement très liée à une politique plus large de changement mondial.

Will Brehm 14:40
Faisons une courte pause. Chaque année, la Société d’éducation comparative et internationale organise des élections pour le poste de vice-président. La manière dont la Société est structurée signifie que cette personne deviendra automatiquement le Président de la Société après avoir servi un an comme Vice-Président. Chaque vice-président, en d’autres termes, se présente pour assumer la présidence. L’élection des vice-présidents est donc un événement important. Cette année, deux candidats exceptionnels ont été nommés : David Post et Aaron Benavot. FreshEd va interviewer David et Aaron sur leurs projets pour le CIES s’ils sont élus. Dans la perspective de ces entretiens – qui seront diffusés le 6 février – vous pouvez me soumettre des questions à poser aux deux candidats. Vous pouvez soumettre vos questions en tweetant @ FreshEdPodcast, ou en envoyant un courriel à will@freshedpodcast.com. Les questions doivent être soumises avant le 25 janvier, alors dépêchez-vous. Revenons à ma conversation avec Arathi Sriprakash sur le colonialisme dans l’éducation comparative et internationale.

L’un des principaux soucis est donc que le savoir indigène n’est pas reconnu comme étant aussi précieux que le savoir provenant du Nord ?

Arathi Sriprakash 16:06
Oui, comme Raewyn Connell l’a souligné il y a dix ans dans son livre “Southern Theory”, le Sud global est une ressource théorique riche et variée. Mais un examen des recherches en éducation comparative révélera rapidement la prédominance des outils et des points de vue théoriques du Nord. Ainsi, le Sud est simplement considéré comme un côté de la collecte de données, le Nord comme un côté de la génération de théories. Et c’est bien là une question de géopolitique. Il s’agit de savoir où se situe l’expertise, où le travail et les institutions ont été financés, et comment des théories et des méthodologies particulières sont rendues légitimes, si vous voulez, par rapport à d’autres. Et je pense, pour vous donner un exemple contemporain, qu’il existe actuellement d’énormes programmes de financement nationaux au Royaume-Uni, où je travaille, pour sponsoriser la recherche en sciences sociales sur l’éducation internationale. Et j’ai constaté que bon nombre de ces programmes comportent une exigence explicite de “renforcement des capacités”. Aujourd’hui, le renforcement des capacités peut prendre de nombreuses formes, mais il fait écho aux programmes d’assistance technique dans lesquels les universitaires occidentaux sont positionnés comme les “experts” qui emploient leurs connaissances pour renforcer les capacités dans les pays pauvres. Je peux voir que les pays matériellement pauvres pourraient bénéficier de la mise en place d’infrastructures, mais il y a un risque que de tels discours sur le renforcement des capacités dans le monde de la recherche positionnent le Sud global comme étant en quelque sorte vide de ses propres ressources épistémologiques pour s’attaquer aux problèmes sociaux complexes auxquels les sociétés sont confrontées. Ainsi, les relations de pouvoir inégales dans la circulation et la production de la connaissance et de l’éducation sont reproduites. Une fois de plus, le Sud est considéré comme une partie de l’extraction de données, ou de l’intervention par l’utilisation de l’expertise théorique du Nord, et en fait, le travail du Nord.

Will Brehm 18:01
Oui, j’ai le sentiment de voir cela tout le temps. Et en fait, je dois dire que j’avoue en faire une partie. Vous savez, en employant des théoriciens français pour essayer de comprendre ce qui se passe au Cambodge. Et donc, j’ai l’impression de faire partie de cet héritage de l’éducation comparée.

Arathi Sriprakash 18:24
Eh bien, je veux dire, je crois que c’est vraiment essentiel pour nous de réfléchir à cela, car j’ai moi aussi été formé au travail des théoriciens du Nord. Cela figure toujours en bonne place dans nos programmes d’études dans ce domaine. Et je pense qu’il est essentiel de reconnaître la façon dont ces héritages façonnent notre engagement sur le terrain et comment nous sommes nous-mêmes impliqués dans ce processus. Il ne s’agit donc pas tant de culpabiliser les chercheurs ou d’essayer de rejeter la faute sur les individus, mais de reconnaître l’histoire du domaine et de comprendre la politique profonde dans ce que nous faisons afin de pouvoir nous engager à agir de manière éthique dans nos engagements à l’avenir.

Will Brehm 19:19
Donc, pour en revenir au terrain, comment les manuels d’éducation comparative comprennent-ils ces questions de production inégale de connaissances et de relations de pouvoir inégales et les dispositifs théoriques créés dans le Nord global et simplement appliqués aux pays en développement ou au Sud global ? Ces questions sont-elles abordées dans les histoires ou dans les manuels d’éducation comparée ? Et, plus essentiel encore, y a-t-il une reconnaissance des connaissances indigènes dans l’éducation comparée ?

Arathi Sriprakash 20:01
Bonne question. Je pense qu’il y a une reconnaissance croissante des savoirs indigènes dans certaines théories, et même du rôle des analyses postcoloniales sur le terrain. Une discussion émerge à ce sujet. Mais je dirais que la façon dont il est fréquemment configuré s’ajoute au récit dominant du domaine émergeant de l’Occident. Donc, il se peut que vous ayez le récit dominant, mais il y a eu différentes façons de savoir, et c’est une sorte d’approche additive. Je pense que Raewyn Connell parle de cela comme d’une épistémologie en mosaïque ; qu’il y a beaucoup de parties différentes qui composent une image. C’est donc une façon de penser la pluralité, mais je pense qu’en général, elle ne s’attaque pas de front aux relations de pouvoir qui font que certaines connaissances deviennent plus légitimes et sont autorisées à dominer d’autres.

Will Brehm 21:14
L’une des choses que vous faites dans cette introduction au numéro spécial est, dans un sens, de donner une nouvelle version de l’un des principaux fondateurs du domaine, Isaac Kandel. Pouvez-vous nous dire cela, en un sens, cette “relecture” de son parcours ?

Arathi Sriprakash 21:33
Oui, d’accord. C’est donc une histoire passionnante sur laquelle Keita a travaillé et Kandel était professeur au Teachers College de Columbia et chercheur principal à l’Institut international de l’université dans les années 20 à 40, je crois, et qui reflète vraiment l’intérêt du domaine pour le relativisme épistémologique que j’ai mentionné plus haut – l’idée de cultures et de personnages nationaux. Kandel reconnaissait vraiment les différences nationales ; il avait cette acceptation de la pluralité dans son travail à un niveau. Ce sont certainement les récits des érudits fondateurs comme Kandel. Mais je pense qu’il est essentiel de reconnaître qu’il écrivait à partir d’une position géopolitique particulière, de sorte que l’Institut international dans lequel il travaillait était impliqué dans l’administration et l’évaluation des systèmes éducatifs coloniaux introduits par le gouvernement américain, des travaux qui, dans l’ensemble, acceptaient les logiques de l’impérialisme américain. Ainsi, ce que nous commençons à voir dans le travail de Kandel, c’est que la différence nationale s’explique par des modèles culturels. Ainsi, différents niveaux culturels ont été employés pour expliquer l’échec de certaines nations dans l’introduction d’un soi-disant “système américain”. Et c’est le système américain que Kandel a décrit comme – et c’est une citation – “l’expérience la plus avancée en matière d’éducation démocratique”. Ainsi, la différence nationale a alors été comprise comme une sorte de fossé civilisationnel. Ainsi, si vous n’avez pas pu avoir le système le plus avancé dans votre pays, alors c’est en quelque sorte le reflet d’un fossé dans votre histoire ou votre capacité civilisationnelle. Ainsi, au cœur de ces idées, même si elles étaient implicites, plutôt qu’explicites, se trouvaient des schémas racialisés de stades de maturité ou de stades de civilisation dans lesquels les sujets coloniaux étaient placés au bas d’une progression évolutive. Ainsi, même si nous pouvons estimer que Kandel et d’autres figures fondatrices dans ce domaine respectent beaucoup la diversité, ces appels à la diversité – cette reconnaissance de la différence nationale – ne sont en fait pas sans hiérarchie. Donc, une épistémologie relativiste peut paraître valoriser la diversité, mais quand elle se situe dans son contexte géopolitique, on peut en fait voir comment elle reproduit une logique coloniale de différence et, en fait, d’assujettissement.

Will Brehm 24:19
Et avec Isaac Kandel, cette histoire a aussi la notion complexe de “l’expert”, où c’est Isaac Kandel lui-même qui peut aider ces civilisations “de niveau inférieur” à gravir les échelons en utilisant le type de remède éducatif prescrit. Et donc, vous avez aussi cette notion, qui est si révélatrice à l’époque, mais aussi si pertinente pour le monde actuel des chercheurs en éducation comparée qui font beaucoup de travail dans le domaine du développement de l’éducation, où nous constatons une hiérarchie et des différences similaires.

Arathi Sriprakash 25:10
Absolument. Et je crois que c’est dans la façon dont notre programme est structuré, c’est dans la façon dont le financement circule dans le domaine, et il y a un véritable héritage épistémologique ici en ce sens que la théorie de la modernisation, même si elle a été fortement contestée pendant de nombreuses décennies, continue à être dominante – si elle n’est pas nommée – dans le domaine actuellement. Parce qu’on considère que l’expertise se trouve en Occident et que l’idée que le non-Ouest se modernise ou se développe de cette manière linéaire, par étapes, avec ces apports corrects de l’Occident, je veux dire que ce genre de relation existe très bien aujourd’hui.

Will Brehm 25:59
Croyez-vous que la théorie de la modernisation est en quelque sorte, à bien des égards, la position supposée de nombreux chercheurs dans ce domaine ?

Arathi Sriprakash 26:08
Je crois que, si ce n’est pas consciemment, c’est quelque chose qui est certainement enraciné dans nos catégories d’analyse, dans notre approche ; certainement dans l’éducation comparative lorsque nous pensons aux systèmes d’un pays et que nous nous disons : “Bon, comment pourrions-nous réformer un système d’éducation dans un autre pour qu’il ressemble à l’idéal ? Je crois donc que ce n’est pas nécessairement quelque chose que les universitaires ou les chercheurs pourraient vouloir mettre en œuvre, mais je pense que c’est ancré dans nos cadres de connaissances, et une partie de cela revient à cette histoire de l’éducation comparée comme ayant l’Occident normatif au centre de notre idée du monde.

Will Brehm 27:06
Donc, une partie de cette inégalité, ou de ce privilège du Nord par rapport à d’autres modes de connaissance et de pensée, provient – comme vous le dites – des structures qui existent de l’éducation comparée. Et donc ces structures peuvent être, comme nous l’avons dit plus tôt, le Congrès mondial, et même là vous montrez qu’il y a une inégalité dans laquelle les sociétés ont, en un sens, un “pouvoir” au sein de cette organisation-cadre.

Arathi Sriprakash 27:39
Oui, absolument. C’est aussi si nous réfléchissons aux publications des revues, certaines des principales revues dans notre domaine sont publiées en anglais, elles sont gérées principalement au Royaume-Uni et en Amérique du Nord, les comités de rédaction sont largement constitués d’universitaires de ces pays. Je pense que tout cela crée des facteurs qui permettent aux cadres de connaissances occidentaux de dominer dans le domaine.

Will Brehm 28:15
Ainsi, votre nouveau numéro spécial tente d’introduire les idées du postcolonialisme dans le domaine de l’éducation comparée. Qu’est-ce que le postcolonialisme en bref?

Arathi Sriprakash 28:29
Ainsi, le postcolonialisme en un mot – je dirais qu’il s’agit de reconnaître les relations historiquement spécifiques du colonialisme qui ont conduit à des inégalités entre les pays et les peuples et groupes, ou les ont aggravées, et le fait de mieux comprendre cette histoire nous permet également de voir les héritages actifs du colonialisme à l’heure actuelle. Nous pourrions donc dire que nous sommes dans l’ère postcoloniale comme dans “l’après-colonialisme”, mais il y a des héritages continus de l’ère coloniale qui modèlent nos systèmes de connaissance actuels ; les hiérarchies autour des institutions, les pratiques culturelles ; et même les façons dont nous n’utilisons peut-être plus le langage des “non civilisés” et des “civilisés”, mais ces hiérarchies de culture et de pratique qui continuent à être assumées, sinon explicitement, implicitement, dans le domaine.

Will Brehm 29:37
Vous avez donc mentionné que nous pouvons reconnaître et réfléchir à l’histoire de notre domaine dans notre propre travail, mais comment pouvons-nous, dans un autre sens, essayer de nous dégager de ce passé colonial qui est si clair, et que vous avez articulé si clairement ?

Arathi Sriprakash 29:59
Eh bien, je crois qu’une partie de la démarche consiste à commencer à réfléchir au rôle que la théorie du Sud et les connaissances indigènes pourraient jouer dans ce domaine. Et je crois qu’en disant cela, ce que je veux souligner, c’est que ces termes, “théorie du Sud”, “savoirs autochtones”, tentent de saisir les nombreuses et riches sources de connaissances sur le monde social qui ont été localisées dans le Sud global ou/et parmi les peuples autochtones. Il n’y a donc pas une seule théorie du Sud ou un seul savoir indigène. Ce ne sont pas des sources statiques et inchangées par le temps, mais comme tout autre système de connaissances, elles sont historiquement localisées et modifiables. Donc, je crois qu’en considérant ces domaines de connaissance comme des ressources légitimes et importantes pour le domaine, nous commençons à décentrer le Nord global dans le processus de production de la connaissance. Et je pense que cela a été assez bien fait par l’école décoloniale qui a émergé le plus en Amérique latine, qui a employé la “culture des colonisés” pour critiquer la colonisation du savoir, si vous voulez.

Will Brehm 31:15
Donc, vous croyez que ce genre d’approche pourrait aider l’éducation comparée en tant que domaine ? A embrasser le postcolonialisme et peut-être à rendre le savoir plus diversifié et plus ouvert et à avoir de nouvelles idées ?

Arathi Sriprakash 31:37
Oui, d’accord, donc je pense qu’il y a quelques choses que cela pourrait faire. Premièrement, l’utilisation de ce cadre théorique non dominant – les théories du Sud, les savoirs indigènes, etc. – peut permettre de saper les relations de pouvoir inégales qui naturalisent la division intellectuelle du travail dans ce domaine, l’idée dont nous avons parlé, selon laquelle les universitaires occidentaux sont des “experts”, que l’expertise se situe en quelque sorte en Occident et peut être appliquée au Sud global. En ce sens, cela interrompt en quelque sorte la prise en compte de l’expertise occidentale dans les travaux sur l’éducation comparée. Deuxièmement, je crois que ces connaissances aident à provincialiser ce qui est autrement considéré comme une épistémologie universaliste, l’idée que la théorie occidentale est universellement applicable. Eh bien, je crois que c’est une idée qui est ébranlée, et je pense qu’elle reconnaît qu’il y a différentes façons d’aborder les problèmes sociaux complexes du monde. Et enfin, je crois que la reconnaissance de la théorie du Sud et des savoirs autochtones réévalue les connaissances qui ont été soumises par les relations de pouvoir coloniales à différentes périodes et à différents moments. Ainsi, qu’il s’agisse du colonialisme, des relations du néocolonialisme et de ce que nous voyons dans le contexte contemporain de la gouvernance néolibérale qui réduit certaines formes particulières de savoir. Je pense qu’il s’agit de cette tâche difficile de contrer ce que Gayatri Spivak appelle la “violence épistémique”, dans laquelle la connaissance et la compréhension de la majorité du Sud sont rejetées, et le Sud continue à être positionné comme “l’autre” colonial. Il s’agit donc vraiment de perturber cette hiérarchie du Sud en tant qu'”autre”, si vous voulez. Ce que nous demandons ici, c’est une conversation permanente sur la manière dont le terrain peut reconnaître ses enchevêtrements coloniaux et travailler à ce type d’engagement postcolonial.

Will Brehm 33:56
Eh bien, cela paraît être une direction future très excitante pour notre domaine, alors Arathi Sriprakash vous remercie beaucoup d’avoir rejoint FreshEd.

Arathi Sriprakash 34:06
Merci beaucoup, Will.

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What is the connection between education and the economy? For many neoclassical economists, the connection is found in Human Capital theory.

My guest today, Professor Steve Klees, thinks human capital theory and rates of return analyses are very problematic.

In our conversation, Steve talks about his new article, “Human Capital and Rates of Return: Brilliant Ideas or ideological dead ends?”, which can be found in the latest issue of the Comparative Education Review. He takes us through human capital theory, its internal logical fallacies, and proposes a set of alternatives.

Steve Klees is a professor of International Education Policy in the College of Education, University of Maryland.

Citation: Klees, Steve, interview with Will Brehm, FreshEd, 54, podcast audio, December 5, 2016. https://www.freshedpodcast.com/steveklees/

Will Brehm  1:45
Steve Klees, welcome to FreshEd.,

Steve Klees  1:52
I’m very glad to be here. Thank you for having me.

Will Brehm  1:55
You are an economist by training. But you have spent most of your career in the comparative and international education field. How do economists typically think about, or look at education?

Steve Klees  2:12
That’s a huge question, but the answer really depends on what kind of economist you’re talking about; they’re different schools of thought. But the the main dominant school of thought is called neoclassical economics. And neoclassical economics is really about competitive capitalist market systems. And within that education is a very important piece of understanding education, economics and development. In particular, neoclassical economists have developed something they call “human capital theory” that is a framework for understanding education’s role in the economy and in society.

Will Brehm  3:10
And how is human capital theory measured? How do economists see human capital?

Steve Klees  3:22
Well, human capital is a latecomer to economics, to neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics goes back to Adam Smith, and the Wealth of Nations in the 1700s and the term “neoclassical” actually was coined at the end of the 1800s, and it’s about how a competitive market system operates. Human capital theory wasn’t developed till the late 1950s, early 1960s. Prior to human capital theory, economists understood the economy in terms of supply and demand, you’d always see economists talking about supply and demand – of small companies, small firms, small households competing with each other – and trying to understand how that competition worked, what you got out of it, how a market system worked.

Prior to human capital theory, economists had a lot of difficulty understanding labor and work. Labor prior to human capital theory was an anomaly. It wasn’t something you could talk about in terms of supply and demand. The economists in those days, in the 50s, look more like sociologists; it was a whole field of labor economics where they studied real world labor, they studied strikes, they studied unions, they studied how large firms operated. But education didn’t really fit into that structure at all – that way of thinking. And there were odd people out in neoclassical economics because they were more like sociologists, and they weren’t talking about competitive market structures and supply and demand, and human capital changed all that

Will Brehm  5:28
How so?

Steve Klees  5:29
Well, it really made economists able to talk and think about education and labor. Labor, especially, as a commodity like any other commodity that’s bought and sold on a marketplace, that has a price, that’s determined by supply and demand in the marketplace. Human Capital theory developed because it was explaining puzzles. People were trying to understand how economies grew. And they understood that there were more workers, and there was more capital investment, but they didn’t really have any idea about quality of work. And the whole idea of human capital, was it explained better, to neoclassical economists anyway, why some countries grew faster versus slower. They called it a revolution in thought, and the idea behind it was essentially simple – that education wasn’t just a consumer good, it was an investment. It was an investment in individuals, and it was an investment by society and societal development.

Will Brehm  6:48
So in a sense, it would be that if an individual were to receive education, or more education than another, they or he or she would be more productive in an economy, and maybe measured through income? Is this the way the neoclassical economists were seeing this?

Steve Klees  7:12
Yes. They looked at two outcomes of education in particular They looked at earnings, and they weren’t interested in private benefits as much; earnings were a benefit to you, income is a benefit to you. But they were interested in, within their framework earnings as a proxy for people’s productivity, like you said. And so, they were trying to get a handle on education’s connection to individual productivity. And secondly, education’s direct influence on economic growth, its effect on gross national product. So you saw starting in the 60s, lots of studies of the “rate of return”, they called it, the return on investment. So education in terms of earnings as a proxy for productivity, and in terms of economic growth measured by gross national product.

Will Brehm  8:15
So based on the rate of return methodology is is some education better than other education for foreign economy or for foreign individuals’ productivity?

Steve Klees  8:27
Yes. I should explain a little bit about rates of return. Rates of return are a measure of benefits and costs. In neoclassical economics, the private sector is motivated by profit. Profit is a signal that this endeavor is valuable. Adam Smith talked about the invisible hand of supply and demand working in the public interest. That’s the profits supposedly representing where peoples’ benefits exceed their costs; where the outcome of whatever you’re making, tables or software or whatever, the benefits exceed the costs. And so economists were looking for something as analogous to that in the public sector. So the idea was to explicitly study the benefits and costs of public sector activities, whatever field, education, health care, environment, transportation, and rate of return is a summary measure, after you figure out what are all the benefits to an education investment, what are all the costs of that investment, and it’s a summary measure to try and get at  – gosh, you know, you’re making 20% on your investment, the benefits exceed costs by 20%. And so that’s applied to lots of different types of educational activities, and other sector activities, to study the returns to education, of various types of vocational education versus academic education; of higher different levels of education, higher education versus early childhood, or primary education; different programs of education. Anything where you can find reasonable monetary measures of outcomes. Sometimes you can’t do that, you’re just looking at test score differences between different programs. And then economists do a more limited array of what they call “cost effectiveness” analysis. But mostly economists really like to go after cost-benefit analysis, because that gives them a metric that they can compare with returns in the private sector: Is this a better investment to take your money out of the private sector, tax it and put in an education or health care or environmental protection?

Will Brehm  11:13
This sort of thinking of cost-benefit analysis of education to an economy, do you see this is problematic in anyway?

Steve Klees  11:24
Yes, the paper you mentioned that I did, and actually much of my work over the last – I hesitate to say it – 40 years (I’ve been working in this field for a while) has been with the problems of neoclassical economics, generally. And more specifically, with the internal dynamic, the internal problems with that field that gives you measures like benefit-cost studies of rates of return. My work has been recently basically saying that even not taking in a critical outside neoclassical economics look, which we can talk about in a little bit, of political economy perspective, for example. But even if you take the neoclassical economics perspective, there are so many problems within that framework, that for me, the benefit-cost analysis/rate of return type measures just fall apart; that they become almost meaningless.

Will Brehm  12:41
How, so? Let’s dig into it, human capital theory, rates of return analyses. If you’re saying that there are problems of the internal logic of neoclassical economics for human capital theory, and for rates of return analysis, can you can you dig more into that? Like how, so? What are some examples of this?

Steve Klees  13:05
I don’t know whether to start with the details or the broader picture. Let me just start with the broader picture, because I think, then the problems with the details become clearer. And the broader picture really revolves around one central idea of neoclassical economics, and that’s the idea of economic efficiency or societal efficiency. They sometimes called it Pareto efficiency after an Italian economist a century ago called Pareto, and it’s a complex idea that I find completely unsound and unreal. And I’ll try and explain the idea briefly, explain why I think it’s unsound, and then give you how it manifests itself in this cost-benefit/rate of return type studies. So efficiency is something, you know, it’s a common sense concept. So to us, people talk about efficiency of this or that; it’s an engineering concept, it’s a physics concept of, you know, you can do more with less somehow. But in education, you can talk about it sensibly, right? Limited ideas of efficiency, like you can talk about an educational system as inefficient because it has a lot of dropouts, or a lot of people repeating grades, or a lot of people who aren’t learning much. So there’s a common sense idea of efficiency that makes sense to all of us. And I have no objections to that. It’s the economist concept of efficiency that’s problematic. And that’s not about an individual sector or individual project, as much as it’s the overall society is deemed economically efficient if it operates according to the assumptions of a very highly competitive market framework that in abstract neoclassical economics discussion is called “perfect competition”. Perfect competition is a competitive system that is so highly competitive that you’ve got many buyers and many sellers of identical products: that nobody’s big, nobody can influence prices, they’re all taking prices in the market, they’re all small potatoes. Consumers and producers are the two major motivators and movers of the economy. Consumers are just out there maximizing their happiness, and producers are just out there maximizing their profits. And if everything functions according to, and information is perfect, you know everything about everything. If you operate according to these simple assumptions, the whole economy is deemed efficient. And what they mean by that is that somehow, not only is there no waste, you’re you’re doing everything as cheaply as you possibly can. But you’ve got the right balance of everything, the correct balance of everything. So you’re producing the right amount of chairs and tables, and movies and hamburgers, and software. There’s something called “correct balance”. And that’s what’s efficient in this. And it’s completely separable from their other major concept, which is equity or fairness or the distribution of these things. So the distribution is sort of irrelevant to efficiency. You can have an efficient society in which half the people in the world are starving. That’s that can be efficient, because efficiency is just about those people who have effective demand, meaning they have money. And they can wave that money in the marketplace and demand goods and services. And so efficiency is really to economists about forgetting equity, forgetting distribution. Are we producing as much as possible with the inputs of land/labor/capital/technology that we have? In the theory, and in practice, this is just simply absurd.

There’s actually in theory neoclassical economists have something called “second best theory”. And second best theory says that if you don’t live in the first best world of perfect competition with all those tight assumptions – unreal, impossible assumptions – but let’s say have one monopoly in one sector in which everything else is highly competitive, second best says in the second best world with just one imperfection, you have no idea if the economy’s efficient at all, there’s no idea if it’s close to efficient at all. Because this framework is so tight that you only get this overall efficiency of the correct balance of things if prices are the accurate signal sending benefit and costs signals to producers that act in the public interest. With one price off, all of the prices are affected. So in practice, efficiency demands, for example, that you have the correct balance, the correct inputs balance of producing yachts for rich people and rice and beans for poor people. Well, that’s just a distributional issue to me. That’s an equity issue to me. There’s no right balance of yachts and rice and beans; there’s no right balance of computer software, higher education, early childhood education, nutritional programs, roads building. There’s no correct balance of that. And in practice, there’s just no vantage point in the sky. That’s what this efficiency idea is. Where you could separate what we produce from who gets it. They’re all integrally tied in practice. And this is what in practice they’re trying to do with cost-benefit analysis of rate of return: get an idea of whether something in particular is efficient or not.

Will Brehm  20:06
Just hearing that, it just makes me think that the theory of the world in neoclassical economics doesn’t match the reality that I live in. I mean, certainly people do not have perfect information when it comes to to buying anything. But at the same time, I also think that this separation of equity and distribution from efficiency seems to have actually happened. The world I see today, there seems to be a huge gap between the rich and the poor, that those eating rice and beans and those on their yachts.

Steve Klees  20:48
Yes, absolutely. The real world today is very problematic in terms of distribution, as we all know. In terms of equity.

Will Brehm  21:04
How is this embodied in rates of return?

Steve Klees  21:08
The whole efficiency framework is translated into guidelines for the public sector through cost-benefit analysis. And not costs and benefits to private individuals they’re after, they’re after costs and benefits to society as a whole. Because they want to correct the market, to account for all the costs and benefits to society as a whole. And so if you’re thinking about education, you think about the benefits of education. They buy benefits in terms of earnings to an individual. That’s a benefit to society if earnings reflect productivity. That’s problematic because earnings are a price, and prices are distorted in real world economies. So there’s no reason to believe that earnings reflect productivity at all. Earnings are determined by market power, by the vagaries of who’s got skills and who doesn’t have skills, on where firms do their business. So the idea of earnings as a proxy for productivity is a problem.

A second problem is that even if you wanted earnings as a proxy for productivity, that’s just one individual benefit. That is a social benefit, because it measures productivity, but there are what they call externalities. There are benefits to other people who were not included in the market transaction, you decide how much education you’re getting, some supplier gives it to you, a public school or private school, a training program, the benefits to education go way beyond you. And those are not taken into account in the market. So when there are benefits beyond the individual, they’re called externalities, because the market doesn’t take them into account. And therefore, the market is making inefficient decisions, because it’s not counting all the benefits. So in education, you can think of lots of benefits that aren’t just to you, your education benefits other people through your coworker productivity, through your family, through household health decisions, through helping your children, through lowering crime rates, through lowering welfare rates. It’s got lots of these external effects. And the second problem with rates of return is measuring those all are very problematic.

And the third problem with rates of return is that even if we were trusting earnings as a good measure, it’s very hard, I would say impossible, to figure out the effect of education on earnings. This goes to our problems, not neoclassical economics, but our problems with research methods generally. Separating our causes from effect, impact evaluation is extremely difficult to the point where I think it can’t be done quantitatively. If, for example, you took 1000 people and you ask them what’s their income, and then you try to figure out what are the dozens of factors that make those incomes different. And then you’ve actually tried to build a mathematical model that would separate those dozens of factors, so that you could say, “Well, their income went up, because they were a union this much, because they had another year of education this much, because they were in a high demand field this much, because they were healthy that much.” I mean, it boggles the mind. I’ve done another paper on the economist statistical procedure called regression analysis that tries to do that – it tries to take the dozens of factors affecting some outcome and separate them out. And my view is that we just can’t do that. So that even the minimal idea of looking at the impact of education on individual earnings is problematic. Taking them all together, I find rates of return and cost-benefit analysis, generally not a good basis for decision-making.

Will Brehm  25:48
But yet, it has been. These methods and this particular theory have been dominant and have been used to make decisions in education systems, among other sectors. So what’s the scholarly track record of those using rates of return and human capital theory? All of the critiques that you put forward seem very plausible to me, but yet rates of return and human capital theory has had quite the long longevity in academic research.

Steve Klees  26:23
Yes, it’s certainly has. And just two things to say in response to that. One is you asked about their track record, and in terms of track record, there’s no testing this. This isn’t something you can predict and then find out was a true. Because, I say the rate of return to expanding higher education is 12% in your country at this time. Is that a good investment, if you decide 12% is a good return, and you put your money in. But there’s no validation of whether you got 12% or not, so there’s no track record in terms of these predictions. They’re making predictions now, for example, about education and GNP. And I just find those scary and absurd. There’s some very interesting economists, very competent economists doing this. Eric Hanushek and [Ludger] Woessmann, and they tried to do regression analysis to say if your PISA scores go up (the PISA being that international test that people take as a proxy for cognitive achievement), how much will your GNP go up? And they come to these conclusions like a 10% increase in cognitive skills gives you a 2% boost on GDP and if everybody moved a standard deviation on PISA, your GNP would grow seven times in the next 30 years. I mean, this is carrying this framework to an absurdity to me. They can’t separate out the impact of education from the dozens and dozens of other factors that influence GDP or GNP, and then to take that out as its influence now and project that 30 or 40 years in the future is just the height of irrational use of a framework of this kind. And I understand why they do it. These are reasonable people, you want good information for decision-making, and to economists, this idea of efficiency, separable from equity is the touchstone.

But the real question for me is the second question you asked: basically, why has this framework been dominant for so long? And neoclassical economists would say at the very simple answer – it’s because of its explanatory power. It explains differences in investments in health and differences in individual behavior. And it’s true, I mean, in differences in individual behavior, this is useful framework because your decisions are affected by the returns to you, and you make decisions about your educational investment versus your investment in health care, versus your decision to go to a movie or your decision to buy a house, about returns to you. And that’s fine. So there is some use for this framework in terms of understanding people’s motivations. But in terms of societal’s efficiency and investment preferences, this framework is bankrupt and it’s empty. So to me, and to many critics, it’s not the dominant framework because of its explanatory power, it’s the dominant framework because it fits. Human capital theory is embedded in neoclassical economics, and that’s embedded in capital market – it fits with a capitalist market economy. The critics would argue the reason there’s so much attention to efficiency and rates of return and technical views of whether you invest in this thing, or that and how much do you do is because it makes sense in terms of efficiency. If you lose that efficiency framework, you realize that this is just a way to support a market system. This is neoclassical economics is an ideological justification for capitalist market systems to be efficient. To act in everybody’s interests aside from equity. If you question that, then you can see neoclassical economics generally, and human capital theory, as basically an ideological framework and ideological bulwark.

The whole skills discourse today comes from human capital theory and a skills discourse seems like common sense. It says if people only had better skills, they would be better off, and their countries and societies would be better off. That skills discourse based as it is on human capital theory and neoclassical economics is very problematic. People today have talked about the “triple economic challenge” that we face, and they talk about the three things: job creation; poverty elimination; and inequality reduction. Human capital theory and neoclassical economics generally gives one simplistic answer to all three challenges: lack of skills or equivalently, the mismatch between what education is producing and what businesses in the economy need. For the critics, lack of skills is not why people are poor, are not why jobs are scarce, and not why societies are so unequal. The culprit for the critics is that the very structure of the world system in which we are living, capitalism most particularly, but patriarchy, racism and other structures. Those very structures are problematic. While capitalism has increased our ability to produce material goods tremendously, so it looks very productive in that way, in another sense, it’s one of the most inefficient and destructive structures that you can imagine. Why? Because almost half the world – the World Bank says 3 billion people – are relegated to the margins of society. Capitalism has not created jobs for them, livelihoods for them. For the vast majority of our global population, if capitalism was an efficient system, we would be taking advantage of the skills and develop the skills of the 7 billion people on the planet and produced a lot more. Capitalism in its 200, 300 years hasn’t done that, and isn’t doing that. You know, some people talk about we live in a meritocracy. What nonsense! These 3 billion people are relegated to the margins of society because they’re not meritorious? It’s not that at all. It’s poverty, unemployment and inequality, not to mention environmental destruction and other problems, are not failures of capitalism, as they’re sometimes seen, but the logical outcome of its inherent structure. So that that in many ways, contrary to prevailing economic views, human capital has been a very destructive discourse. This is contrary to what the majority of economists think as it’s been brilliant, but it’s been a destructive discourse, because it’s really blamed individuals for their lack of skills, their lack of investment in the right skills, the lack of good choices. And so instead of understanding problematic structures that we need to do something about, we’ve been directing attention towards the supply of individuals and how to fix that. And we’ve been fixing it for decades. And the payoff with poor countries is abysmal. And the payoff even within rich countries is abysmal. The inequalities within the US, the level of hunger in the United States, the level of marginalization, the level of poor dead end jobs, the level of insecurity, the level of environmental destruction, this is not an efficient system.

Will Brehm  36:04
Turning to alternatives. I mean, is it even possible, or can we even have an education system in a capitalist economy without human capital theory? It almost seems like many of these problems that we see in education in terms of equity that you were just mentioning stem from the capitalist economic systems that that are pervasive in most countries. So how can we envision and create education systems in alternative ways that account for equity while still being in capitalist economies?

Steve Klees  36:48
Yes. All you’re asking today’s tough questions.

Will Brehm  36:55
I apologize.

Steve Klees  36:57
That’s okay. Let me preface my response to education with a little bit on how these alternatives are viewed to the very structures in which we live. Because education can only be successful if it’s a part of a challenge to those structures in fundamental ways. And there’s a lot of alternatives. Everything is contested terrain in this world; everything is up for grabs, up for debates with different views. So I view the alternative to neoclassical economics as what I call “political economy”. Political economy is a contested term and people on the right use it as well as people on the left. I’m using it more from the left of center point of view of critics of capitalism, critics of other world system structures. And for me, a political economy perspective today raises questions about the structures of the world system in which we live.

It’s the intersection of feminist perspectives, of post- perspectives, postcolonial, post structural, neo-Marxist perspectives, queer theories about heterosexism in society, disability theories, critical race theories. Not that these theories are identical, not that these approaches are identical, but all of them see marginalization as central, and all of them see marginalization not as failures of the world system -they’re failures for sure – but more is a logical consequence of the structures of patriarchy and racism and capitalism in which we live. And while there’s agreement that reproduction is pervasive, that is this marginalization is not an aberration, systems are out there that reproduce and legitimate marginalization and inequality. And the education system is part of that, as are all of the systems in which we live.

But the critics, the political economists, as I label them agree that while reproduction is pervasive, there are lots of spaces for progressive action. Through exercising individual and collective agency. You have the ability, and especially collectively, we have the ability to challenge these structures. And collective challenge is perhaps the watchword of political economists. Social movements like the women’s movement, like the civil rights movement. These are worldwide now. Like the landless movement in Brazil and now other countries. The poorest people in the world are organized and having an influence on policy. The untouchable movement in India, not anti-globalization, but the alter-globalization movement and in human rights movements and the children rights movement. And so there’s lots of examples of contestation at the systemic level and in education.

There’s lots of examples in every education in every city, in every country, and in every school system of what political economists call more progressive approaches to education. The legacy of people at Paolo Freire, the famous Brazilian educator who founded a field that we call today “critical pedagogy”. Critical pedagogy is a political economy approach to education, arguing that while reproduction is pervasive in schools, there’s lots of ways to challenge that. And so people, individual teachers challenge that all the time. They close their doors to their classroom, they use different learning materials, they teach their students differently about fairness, about equity, about the structures in which they live, they raise questions on that. And it’s not just individual teachers, there are systems of it. In Brazil, the landless movement which I just mentioned, have their own schools that are Freirean, that are participatory, that are so different from the technicist technical approach to education that we have today throughout the world. In Brazil, something called the citizen school movement that, again, is very participatory, that involves the community. We say “community involvement” all the time, but this is serious community involvement. This is serious democracy for students, for teachers, for administrators, participating and directing curriculum, directing grading, making decisions at a local level together, and sometimes very explicitly challenging the types of feeding education into work and into the labor market that dominates so strongly. On the alternative, for most political economists, when you reject the sort of functionalist view of sociologists, of society, of efficiency of markets, and say, “This is not something in which everybody is benefiting, there’s conflict here, there’s different interests, and the only way that’s going to change is through struggle, through individual and collective struggle.”

What that means in terms of alternative system-wide is difficult to say. At a minimum, where we’re not a neoliberal form of capitalism. Capitalism in the 60s, and 70s was a much more liberal capitalism in which government intervention was recognized as necessary to correct the ills that were essentially built into the structure of capitalism. Neoliberalism starting in the 80s with Reagan and Thatcher and Kohl in Germany said: Government is the problem, the market is the solution. We need to get away from that. We need to restore the legitimacy of government action, we’ve got the sustainable development goals of the United Nations on the table. Goals that are very ambitious about improving the world, we’re not going to get there under neoliberal capitalism. We’re not going to get there when we think it’s illegitimate for government to direct action. We’re not going to get there if everything is a public-private partnership and depends on corporate profitability in order to direct that system.

And maybe we have to move beyond capitalism. At the local level there’s lots of alternatives. And  broadly speaking, it’s the subject to a whole another conversation. And I have a paper coming out next year on capitalism in education that talks about alternatives, so maybe we’ll do another podcast there. But the broad answer is, you need to build towards a more participatory democracy and more towards a workplace democracy. The problem with capitalism is that our workplace is authoritarian. We teach democracy in the political sphere; we don’t have a lot of that at a very participatory level either. But we need democracy in the workplace as well.

Will Brehm  45:28
It seems like a lot of what you’re saying is that we have to think beyond the connection of education as being for the development of human capital, and having a different value of education. And there can be many it sounds like, and many different ways of achieving those values or putting those values into action. But it seems like that’s the first step: decoupling, or de-linking the connection between education and human capital development.

Steve Klees  46:05
No, I would agree. And to be fair to human capital theorists, some of them recognize that broad connection. It’s got narrowed in practice so much that all we’re looking at as the connection to education to the workplace. But citizenship can be subsumed in that human capital framework. The problem is its basis in efficiency. You want to talk about the many things education does, the many more things we want it to do. We don’t want to just make education about workplace. We don’t want to make education just about literacy and numeracy. We need education for peacebuilding, for people to not be aggressive, for people to be fair with each other, for people to have resilience, and people to be creative. So there’s lots of purposes of education, and human capital theory and practices just narrow the field too much. And more broadly speaking about this political economy framework versus a more mainstream dominant human capital neoclassical framework, the political economy framework doesn’t offer the technical policy guidance that rates of return give. For neoclassical economists, policies are a dime a dozen. You just do your cost-benefit analysis and this year, vocational education is better than academic education, higher education is better than primary education.

If you reject that framework, what you have is human capital theory, neoclassical economics – our ideologies masking as science. It’s absurd to think that there’s some way to assess technically, the tradeoff between higher education and primary education, between education and health and the environment. All we have is a messy, participatory democratic struggle of individuals and groups with some common interests and some different interests. And for me, what we have to do is find ways to facilitate that struggle and in doing so, economics and the dominant scientific perspective says you need to stay neutral and objective. For me, I’ve learned that you always take sides. That when I write a paper, when I teach a class, when I’m doing research, when I engage in policy, when I engage in my life, I always have to take a side. And if you don’t think you’re taking a side, you are because this is a struggle. This is contestation. And I guess my concluding point is that for me, this is what I said in the paper you cited, neoclassical economics and human capital theory are ideological dead ends. But fortunately for all of us, there are lots of alternatives.

Will Brehm  49:29
Well, Steve, Klees, you gave us a lot to think about in this conversation. Thank you so much for joining FreshEd, and you’re definitely welcome back when that new paper comes out on capitalism in education.

Steve Klees  49:41
Thank you very much for having me.

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The Globalization and Education Special Interest Group of the Comparative and International Education Society will be hosting a public webinar on December 12 entitled “Puncturing the Paradigm: Education Policy in a New Global Era.” The webinar will bring together the four co-editors of the newly published Handbook of Global Education Policy, Karen Mundy, Andy Green, Bob Lingard, and Toni Verger.

During the lead up to that event, FreshEd will interview the co-editors to set the stage for the webinar. Today I speak with Professor Andy Green about the global education policy of social cohesion.

Although we often think of education policy as primarily concerned with economic development, it also has been historically connected to the idea of creating a cohesive group of people who share certain norms and customs. Benedict Anderson called this “imagined communities.”

Andy Green has looked at the effect from education on social cohesion across the globe.

Andy Green is Professor of Comparative Social Science and Director of the Center on Learning and Life Chances at the Institute of Education, University College London.

Citation: Green, Andy, interview with Will Brehm, FreshEd, 52, podcast audio, November 21, 2016. https://freshedpodcast.com/andygreen/

Will Brehm 2:01
Andy Green, welcome to FreshEd.

Andy Green 2:04
Well, Will, it’s pleasure to be here to talk to you.

Will Brehm 2:07
What is social cohesion?

Andy Green 2:11
Well, social cohesion, fundamentally, is all those properties which bind societies together. So, it might well be common values, common lifestyles, common identities. It may simply be the rule of law. You can define it in quite a number of different ways, and I would say you need to define it quite broadly, though, as the set of attitudes, values, and behaviors that binds societies together. Bearing in mind that social cohesion actually works quite differently in different places. So, I wrote a book some years back called ‘Regimes of Social Cohesion’ with my co-author Jan Janmaat, and we were looking at countries across the developed world, basically, at what factors seem to be holding their societies together. What was the nature of social cohesion in those different societies? And it transpired there were groups of countries basically, in different regions which were quite distinctive. So, for instance, English-speaking countries -which aren’t a region, of course, but have a common cultural history- tended to have a core set of key values, not a strong emphasis on a broad set of common values, because they’re very diverse societies generally. And the key value tends to be about opportunity, and rewards for merit, if you like meritocracy, some people would say, which is a little bit different from what you’d find in countries with Republican systems like France, where there’s much less emphasis on social mobility, but more emphasis probably on equality of outcomes. And where a dominant lifestyle traditionally, with a broad set of values, has been rather more important. Although this is clearly under strain these days. And then again, you get Scandinavian countries where identity and social cohesion revolves very much around their particular forms of welfare state, and a very, very strong belief in those countries in equality of outcomes. And you can find different things again, if you go to East Asian countries, for instance, where you can provisionally sort of identify a form of social cohesion based very much on Confucian values. So, here it’s respect for elders, respect for the state, and so on, as well as a common sense of cultural identity are extremely important. So, it would seem that social cohesion does work somewhat differently in different countries. People do try to develop a single definition, which is okay, in my view if it’s a very broad definition. They also try to measure it with a single set of measures, which is rather difficult because it’s basically a cluster of different things. And the cluster of different properties may be different in different countries. And so, having a single scalar measurement is rather difficult. Very often, though, the key measure is taken to be levels of social trust. That’s to say how far we trust other people, and particularly how far we trust people we don’t know.

Will Brehm 5:43
What’s the connection between social cohesion and education?

Andy Green 5:48
Social cohesion has always been a primary aim along with economic development, and so on and so forth. It’s almost always been there somewhere in the big visions for education systems.

Will Brehm 5:59
So, governments, when they create policy, they would not only see their education system as producing future laborers in the national economy but also creating citizens and members of society that would come together in some form, broadly defined notion of social cohesion with these different values being emphasized in different countries.

Andy Green 6:25
They would. It’s been typical of all newly created public education systems from the early 19th century onwards, that forming of citizens was one of the main purposes of an education system as well as you know, developing skills and so on and knowledge for the economy. It tends to be particularly important in new states, which don’t have a common identity firmly established, or institutions firmly established. Young states always emphasize the forming of citizens is a primary role of education. In older democracies, it’s tended to take second seat to economic development. I suppose skills formation becomes more important than citizen formation, but it’s not disappeared, that’s the important thing. Almost every document that you’ll find coming out of national governments, and indeed, transnational organizations, will refer in some way to the importance of cultivating social cohesion and citizenship and so on through the education system.

Will Brehm 7:34
So, would you be able to say that social cohesion is, in a sense, a global policy of education?

Andy Green 7:43
Yes, I would, but it’s referred to in different ways, perhaps in different international organizations depending on their remit. So, the OECD, the European Commission will use the word social cohesion quite frequently. OECD likes the term social capital as well. If you look at the outputs of, say, the World Bank, or UNESCO, where they’re looking at a wider range of countries, including less developed countries, peace education might well be the main focus, or post-conflict education, education in conflict societies or post-conflict societies. They’re all talking, though, about different forms of social cohesion, really, with different emphasis.

Will Brehm 8:30
So, what sort of education initiatives exist for peace education, or citizenship education, or social capital? Like, concretely, what are these educational initiatives that are either being promoted at the global level or within the national level or perhaps both?

Andy Green 8:51
Well, at the national level, most countries have citizenship education as part of the curriculum. It may be cross-curricular, it may be a separate subject, but it’s there in almost all countries. There may be allied to that a number of procedural things around schools, say, which are designed to boost cooperation amongst children and common understandings and so and this may take the form of schools, councils or these kind of things -so structures will be part of it as well as the curriculum. Other initiatives have been tried in countries in the throes of conflict or in post-conflict societies. Common education across divides, say in Northern Ireland during the troubles, there was quite a strong initiative to build a set of schools which would cross the Catholic-Protestant divide and so on. This kind of thing has been tried in various different societies. Education about the values of peace and so on is something that’s often tried in many conflict-ridden and post-conflict societies. But you could add to that broader concerns about the social society, if you like, and how education could contribute and include environmental education. Notably, education on relationships, on birth control, and family planning, and so on in poorer countries, would be seen as part of education for social cohesion because of its proven very beneficial effects in raising the esteem of women and in reducing population growth, and so on, which it can have all sorts of, you know, social benefits. So, I would extend the range of social cohesion policies quite widely in that sense if you’re talking about developing countries.

Will Brehm 10:59
What has been the efficacy of some of these initiatives? Like, are they creating more social cohesion?

Andy Green 11:08
Well, this is where you have to start making this difficult distinction between what benefits individuals and benefits society as a whole. Politicians tend to start with the easy part, which is measuring the benefits to individuals, and certainly for developed countries -and it probably applies for developing countries as well, although we don’t always have such good data to show it- the general pattern is that more educated people tend to be more tolerant of other values and lifestyles, they tend to be more politically engaged, they tend to show better signs of health, and fewer signs of depression and negative aspects of health. They’re less likely to be overweight as children, and the list goes on and on and on. They tend to vote more in countries as well. So, at the individual level, higher levels of education, particularly up to degree levels, are certainly associated with social outcomes, which most people would consider good. But there are questions about that way of looking at it. There are two sorts of questions. One is ‘was it the education which actually caused them to have those social attributes, or did they have them already? ‘ Is it to do with who is selected what you call selection effects in statistical analysis, which is an important issue because it may be education is not adding that much, it’s the people themselves who go into higher education, for instance? The evidence, though, tends to suggest there is an effect from learning, as well as any effects from selection. So, at the individual level, yes. There are clear benefits to individuals from higher levels of education. They’re likely to be more engaged politically, they will trust more generally, they’re more likely to vote, and they’re likely to be healthier.

Will Brehm 13:21
So, how do we apply that from the individual to the social benefit? Can we aggregate? Can we just look at all of these individual benefits and say, we know if most people in society have these individual benefits, then we have some level of social cohesion? Is that possible? Is that how the policymakers do it?

Andy Green 13:43
That tends to be the start of the reasoning, but it rather quickly breaks down because many of these properties don’t aggregate for one reason or another. So, I mean, to take a quite commonly cited example: generally speaking, more educated people in most countries are more tolerant. They’re more tolerant of other sexualities, other lifestyles, other religions, and so on, so forth. That doesn’t apply in every country, but in most countries, there is a relationship there. However, better- educated countries are not necessarily more tolerant in the aggregate. And what we see in many countries now is increasingly educated societies judged on people’s qualification levels and declining levels of tolerance. So, something else is intervening…It’s not that education is not promoting tolerance; it probably is, but other things are working against it. So, you can have increasing levels of education at a societal level, but it’s not showing up in increasing levels of tolerance. So, you then have to start asking difficult questions about what else is involved in the context which may be working against it, and how far the individual’s tolerance anyway aggregates at the social level to more individuals being tolerantly to a more tolerant society, generally other things being equal. That’s where the difficult questions start to enter in.

Will Brehm 15:22
And so, what sort of theories have been put forward to explain social cohesion at the group level rather than at the individual level?

Andy Green 15:33
Well, you have to start talking about what social scientists call “mechanisms.” So that was the transmission mechanism for individual values, affecting societal values, and so on. And the research that’s done in this area more or less identifies four kinds of effects. The simplest will be what I’ve described already, for tolerance. It will be what we call absolute direct effects. So, a direct effect is where education through learning, or socialization, or whatever’s happening, is having a direct effect on somebody’s attitudes, which carries through into later life. That’s a direct effect. It would be an indirect effect if education was increasing people’s employability, got them better jobs in later life. And if it were the better job that were raising their levels of tolerance. So, an absolute direct effect is one that occurs without any mediation from anything else. And being absolute, it means that it should aggregate. So, most of the research on tolerance suggests that actually, in large part, it is an absolute direct effect. And the argument made by psychologist would be along the lines of higher education raises your cognitive abilities, which makes you better able to disentangle poor arguments, to see behind stereotypes, to challenge the logic of prejudicial kind of thinking. But the second part of it will be education simply, as they used to say, broadens your horizons, you get more experience of different types of people in different countries, different living situations, even if at a distance, you know. You have a wider experience, and that in itself is said to make you more sympathetic to difference and, therefore, you know, the other person. So, education there is making a direct contribution immediately. It may make further contributions later through helping people get jobs, which may make them even more tolerant. It may. But the complication there is that there are countervailing effects from other things. Which may mean that even though education is increasing amongst individuals, and at the societal level, generally, you don’t see rising levels of tolerance. But it’s still a direct effect. It doesn’t mean that education is not helping, it just means it’s not helping enough to counteract things which are having a negative effect. So, that would be the simplest kind of aggregation mechanism. So, you could say that education here is certainly contributing to an aspect of social cohesion. Now, of course, in some societies, such a high value isn’t placed on tolerance as in others, and social cohesion may not rest on it to such a degree. But in most Western societies, tolerance would be fairly key. Another situation would be where you have these direct effects, but in addition to that, you have other effects, which result further down the line from the impact of your education on employment. So, to take the tolerance example, again, you may have been socialized and learn towards to being and having more tolerant attitudes, your higher qualifications may also get you a higher-level job, which may in itself promote more tolerant attitudes through various psychological mechanisms, maybe you feel less threatened by others and so on and so forth. So, that would be a kind of a cumulative process. And then, rather different is what we call relative effects or positional effects. And this is where education is having an effect on something, but it is not the absolute level of education you achieve that has the effects. It’s the level of education of yourself in relation to others. So, it may be that some of the benefits of education result from the fact that you are better educated than others, you get a better job than others. And it’s that better job compared with others that has the social benefits for you. And in that kind of situation, it can be a zero-sum game. You can have more and more people being educated, but it’s only the best-educated who get the benefits. And the classic illustration of this would be work that’s been done by Nie and his collaborators for the US actually on political engagement. And their finding is really that the effects of education on being engaged politically in key activities, and they’re talking about belonging to parties, campaigning for parties, voting, of course, having particular influential roles in parties. They’re saying that actually, this is promoted by education, but it’s strictly positional, in as much as only some people can be at the center of the action, and only the people at the center of the action are going to have real influence. And that, again, is a positional matter. So, it’s only the very best educated, who will get those key roles in party campaigns, that will get to advise people, who will get the ear of important people, who will influence policy and because of all those opportunities they’re having, they’re more likely to be interested and engaged to do those things. And the argument these authors make is that it’s a zero-sum game, basically. There are only a certain number of what they call network central positions where you can have an influence. And twice as many people may have degrees, but it’s still only going to be that small percentage who are best connected and best educated, who will have the effect. So, this is how they would explain why in a country like the US, where people are more and more educated, actually levels of political engagement are going down in actual fact. Voting levels are going down, and so on and so forth. And what’s more, the younger generations, who are more educated than older generations, are less prone to be politically engaged. And that’s why it’s a relational thing, it’s positional. So, not everybody can be the best educated. So, in this case, the effects of education on individuals is not translating into societal benefits at all. It’s translating into some benefits for some people. That’s true probably have quite a lot of the things we think of in terms of the social benefits of education. They are probably of that nature, they are positional. And one other possibility, which is really quite different, actually. But it’s quite important nevertheless, is what you might call or what I would call distributional effects. And this is not to do with individuals. Individuals don’t have distributions. It’s to do with how education and skills, the outcomes of education, are distributed across society. And whether it’s that very distribution that affects social cohesion. And we have done some research on this, which follows a similar logic to a lot of the research done by people like Wilkinson and Pickett on the effects of income inequality on social outcomes. So, the very popular and widely disseminated work of Wilkinson shows that if you look across a range of societies, societies, where incomes are more equal, generally have better health, lower childhood obesity, lower suicide rates, lower mental health problems, they have higher levels of political engagement, and the list goes on and on and on. I mean, so many social benefits, some of which you’d associate with social cohesion, are related to lower levels of inequality. Trust, by the way, is primary amongst those. So, it would seem that it’s hard to explain exactly what’s happening. But it would seem that lower levels of inequality and income, anyway, is important. While in the same way, lower levels of inequality and skills may be important to achieving certain social benefits from learning. And there is a psychological theory behind this, which is quite plausible. It’s quite hard to prove statistically, but certainly, there’s a theoretical model of its believable, and that basically is about in societies with very unequal levels of education, very unequal levels of skill, the social distance between groups of people at different levels tends to be greater. Therefore, compensation tends to be more difficult and suspicion is higher, and trust is lower. But at the same time, in unequal societies, you have more high-stakes competition. There’s much more at stake in any given competition over resources, jobs, housing, whatever it is, there is more at stake quite simply because the top end is a long way away from the bottom end. And the argument that social psychologists make about these situations is that -and actually, you can find it in behavior of animals as well- if you put a lot of people in high stakes competitions, where there’s high levels of inequality, there’s high levels of stress and anxiety, and stress and anxiety is associated with all sorts of negative social outcomes, particularly negative health outcomes. So, those would be distributional kind of relationships which is education skills and positive social outcomes. And here, it’s not how much you educate any individual that matters, it’s really how you spread the education around.

Will Brehm 26:51
So, of these four approaches, the absolute direct effects, the cumulative effects, the relative effects, and the distributional effects, which approach do you normally think is the correct way to approach social cohesion?

Andy Green 27:09
I think it depends on the case. It’s horses for courses. You’re looking at particular values in each case, things you can measure. And in the case of tolerance, I think the argument is pretty strong that it is a direct effect of education, which can be affected by context, as well. But it is an effect of education. If you’re looking at, as I said, something like political engagement, it is pretty positional. And there may be quite a lot of other effects, which are in the same way positional. If you’re looking at trust, I will put that in amongst those things where you have to look at the distributions, how education is spread around. It seems just if not more important than the actual levels of education in the averages in a country in cross-country studies. And this is where policymakers lose touch slightly, I think, because they’re inclined to only look at individual direct effects. It’s easier to comprehend. They’re a bit suspicious of distributional matters even though the evidence is there.

Will Brehm 28:22
Talking about social trust, how is that even measured? How do you go about measuring social trust in a society?

Andy Green 28:30
Well, social trust has been measured, actually, for quite a long time. Going back -for Western societies- at least going back to the 1960s. There was a study by Almond and Verba about civic culture, which had some of the first measures. And it’s been measured, going through with the European value survey and the world value survey starting not long after that, right through to the present day. And they generally asked the same question, which is, how much do you think other people can be trusted? Or would you never be too careful? Or variance on that? So, there’s a pretty standard question they ask people, and it does seem to be tapping into the core aspect of what you’re looking at, which is ‘do people trust other people they don’t know?’ So, social trust is not about trusting members of your family. It’s not about trusting people you know well; it’s not about trusting institutions. It’s about trusting people you don’t know. And it can be, it’s been measured. And it varies across countries very substantially. And it changes over time rather slowly. But the differences are very marked. So, in Scandinavian countries, typically 70 or 80% of people will say they generally trust other people. In some Latin American countries, it goes down to 20%. And we can do various tests to see if they are answering the question in the way we are meaning it to be asked. And it does seem that they are talking about the same thing, which is do they trust strangers. And it turns out that this is fairly crucial to -certainly is central to social cohesion. It’s the only thing that everybody would agree probably is a measure of social cohesion. But it seems to be very important to economic life, GDP growth has been related to social trust, clearly, it’s much easier to conduct business if you can trust people, legal costs are low, and so on. It’s also been linked to innovation and economic life because people cooperate together better. And it’s linked to a whole range of positive social outcomes, not least good health, and, of course, low levels of conflict. It’s almost the inverse of conflict. So, trust is a definable and a measurable phenomena. You could also measure it ‘trust for institutions,’ political trust, which is slightly different. It is important, it has consequences, and it is a key part of what most people mean by social cohesion. And it varies a lot across countries.

Will Brehm 31:30
And so, what would be the connection of social trust to education? Do people learn social trust in schools, or are there other factors learning social trust in families or in religious institutions?

Andy Green 31:48
Well, that is a very good question actually and not easily answered. I mean, a lot of people who write on this will say that trust is a very fundamental attitude, it’s learned early in life, it’s about childhood socialization, you basically learn to trust through trusting your parents, and other members of your family. And I’ve no doubt there’s some truth in that. So, we’re talking about really fundamental socio-psychological properties of people. And in one respect, trust is almost synonymous in that sense with what you might just call normally optimism. You know, you generally expect to get the best out of any situation. Because you feel in control, because you trust others not to cheat, because you think they won’t cheat with you, which has a lot to do with your position and social status, but also your just levels of confidence. So, those childhood influences are extremely important. But the research also shows that circumstances in adulthood do change people’s levels of trust. So, you know, if they have bad experiences as adults, they can move quite a lot on the trust scale. And social contexts then are making a difference, whether it’s childhood contexts or adult contexts. And there is a remarkable and quite wide shifts going on. So that, for instance, in England, something like I think 50%, 60% of people used to say they trust other people, say when I was growing up in the 60s. This is now down to below 30%, which you could argue is a real culture shift. You know, we live in a different type of society now where people are much less trusting of other people. Why does education affect it? Well, that’s not so easy to answer either. It does seem to be true in most countries that more educated people are more trusting. It’s probably partly to do with the fact that they’re more confident and more optimistic. It may be because they’ve been able to rid themselves of some prejudices which might otherwise stop them trusting people. It may be because they’ve been through a school system that really puts a very strong emphasis on people cooperating. And one of the interesting things about the Nordic education systems is that they have children that that cooperation is absolutely a central purpose of learning with young children particularly. And they keep children in the same classes through the whole of school with the same sets of children, the same teachers. And the purpose of this is very much to promote a group of people who learn how to work with each other to share and to cooperate. So, probably it’s both the behavioral things you learn in education which affect it and also the more general effects of education on your levels of confidence. As well as maybe some cognitive things, some knowledge, which is beneficial. So, it’s quite complex, but there’s no doubt the more educated people in most countries are more trusting.

Will Brehm 35:11
So, if social cohesion is a global policy, and most national governments are thinking of something about social cohesion in their education policies. And if social trust is a good measure of social cohesion, what sort of advice would you give policymakers about accurately thinking about social trust and education?

Andy Green 35:41
Okay, well, it is, as we’ve discussed, a key aspect of social cohesion. It should be at the center of concerns and possibly more than it is in policymaking. I would say two things. I mean, behavior is important. Cooperation in schools is important. So, you know how children relate to each other in school, how they’re taught to relate to each other, is building a foundation of cooperation and trust. So, it’s not just about the syllabus, it’s about the hidden curriculum, and so on. It’s about the rules, and the way schools are organized, which is very important. But the other point I’ve made, which arises out of our research, is that you really have to address not only the average levels of education as a society, which is the obsession of most policymakers because of the PISA test and all the rest of it. You’ve got to look at how education is distributed. Countries with very, very unequal distributions of skills are going to be unequal societies, and they’re going to be less trusting societies. We know this almost certainly applies across the developed world in any case. So, you have to look at both. You have to try to raise the general standards of education and skill, but you have to look at how these skills are distributed and try to reduce the rather large gaps that are actually increasing in social gaps in skills in many countries.

Will Brehm 37:17
Well, Andy Green, thank you so much for joining FreshEd.

Andy Green 37:21
Thank you.

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